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GIFTS TO CHARITIES. SECTION XI, ACT
APRIL 26th, 1855.
"No estate, real or personal," says the 11th section of the
Act of April 26th, 1855' "shall hereafter 2 be bequeathed, devised
or conveyed to any body politic, or to any person in trust for
religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by deed
or will, attested by two credible and at the same time disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month before the decease
of the testator or alienor, and all dispositions of property contrary thereto shall be void and go to the residuary legatee or
devisee, next kin or heirs, according to law; Provided that any
disposition of property within said period, bonta fide made, for a
fair and valuable consideration, shall not be hereby avoided."
OBJECT OP THE STATUTE.

The object of this statute is not declared to be the welfare of
the state, in lessening the facility for the accumulation of property by religious and eleemosynary corporations or other institutions, (the policy of the various statutes of mortmain), but the
protection of heirs and next of kin from large and improvident
dispositions by persons on their death-beds, or when their minds
are enfeebled by the hopes and fears of approaching dissolution.'

The protection, not of heirs and next of kin, but of the dying,
from the craft of priest and layman alike, when they come, not to

minister comfort and spiritual consolation but to gather spoils for
4
some favorite charity, is declared the object by Gordon, J. Mit1P. & L. 537.
2
A will written in 1843, but which remained ambulatory until the testator's death in 1866, is not within the operation of the act. Taylor v. Alitchell, 57 Pa. 209.
3Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
4
Reimensnyder v. Gans, ixo Pa. 17.
(167)
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chell, J., 5 thinks its object was not-to prevent bequests to churches
or religious uses, under a feeling of moral obligation for benefits
received, either temporal or spiritual, but to require that if made,
they shall be made when the judgment is clear, and the obligation is not sharpened or exaggerated by the terrors of impending
death. That experienced and able jurist, Judge Penrose, thus
states the object of the statute, "Its manifest purpose was the
protection of testators, and through them, of their residuary
legatees or devisees, heirs or next of kin, from unseemly importunities on behalf of religious or charitable- (so-called) uses; and
hence it has never been doubted that such residuary legatees,
heirs or next of kin may, under the maxim quilibet j5rotest
renunciarejurePro se in/roducto, waive the benefit of the Act,
and permit the charities to take effect, despite of the fact that
the testator has not complied with the provisions of the statute.
This of course they 'could not do, if the Act, instead of being
simply for their protection, was intended on the ground of public
policy with regard to property held in perpetuity, to impose corporate disability" [i. e. incapacity on the part of corporations or
other legatees, devisees, or grantees, to take by the devise, be6
quest or grant.]
THE REI.IGIOUS OR CHARITABLE USES.

There are charitable uses which are not religious, but Lewis,
C. J., knew of "no'religious use which could be recognized at all
as free from superstition, that is not' included in the definition of a charitable use." 7 This'jurist says that "If we were to
attempt a definition which Would embrace all gifts for charitable
uses, we should adopt the langu ge of the eminent patriarch of
our profession, Mr. Binney, as expressed in his argument in
Vidal el aly. The City of Philadelphia: "whatever is given for
the love of God, or for the love of your neighbor, in the Catholic
and universal sense [whbt is that?] given from these motives,
and to these ends [what ends?] free from the stain or taint of
every consideration that is personal private or selfish, is a gift
for charitable uses, according to tiat religion from which the law
of charitable uses has been derived." The worthlessness of such
a definition is apparent after the mere perusal of it. A from the
6

Hoffner's Estate, i61 Pa. 331.

6

Hildeburn's Estate, 4 Dist. 40.
Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.

7
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love of B, makes a gift to him by will.
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Is this within the statute?

We shall see not. A erects a university whereat instruction is
to be imparted to students at a price to them less than the
actual cost, but the principal motive is to perpettiate his name
to future generations, though it may be slightly tinctured with
interest in his fellow-men. Is this a charity? We shall see that
it is.' "If," comments Woodward, C. J., "an act to be a charity must indeed be free from any taint of selfishness, very much
that passes under the name is spurious, whilst the genuine article is so extraordinary a virtue that we ought not to wonder
that an inspired Apostle ranked it above the christian graces of
Faith and Hope."
Parsons J., quoting Binney's definition, remarks upon it.
"This is undoubtedly charity in its highest and
best sense * * * * but were we to apply it to the transactions of this wicked world, I fear it would lead to serious embarrassment, In the first place it is utterly impracticable, for it
is God only who'can look into the heart and judge of motives.
In the second place * * * how many of our noblest and most
useful public charities would stand such 6 test? How many donations to public charities are made out of pure love to God and
love to man, free from the stain or taint of every consideration
that is personai, private and selfish? Who can say that the millionaire who founds a hospital or endows a college and carves
his name thereon in imperishable marble, does so from love to
God and love to his fellow, free from the stain of selfishness." 9
But it is' useless; to attempt a general statement of what a charity
is. The decisions in special cases will assist us to induct a conception of it that will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes.
SCHOOLS, COLLEGES, UNIVERSITIES.

A gift to a seminary, though a secular institution, e. g.
Princeton University"0 is void unless it complies with the statute.
So is one to found a university which shall be purely secular."1
Such gifts are for "charitable uses."
Void also is a gift to an
existing school, under denominational control, in which-religious
instruction is imparted the charges in which, for board and in-

WMiller v. Porter, 53 Pa.
9

292.

Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120- Pa. 624.
'0McMillen's Appeal, ir W. N. C. 440.
"Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292.
o
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struction, are less than the actual cost. 2 Such a use is both
charitable and religious. In Arnold's Estate" a devise to Ursinus
College, made the day before the testators' death was held void.
The college's expenses were met in part by the income from endowments, so that the cost of tuition was in all cases less than
it would otherwise be. Some students were educated gratuitously. This made the gift one for a charitable use. Being to
an incorporated institution, founded and conducted as a charity,
it was not necessary that the testator should have specified the
purposes to which it should be applied.
HOSPITALS.

A .gift to a hospital, though not under denominational control, and though connected with no religions function, e. g. to
the Allegheny General Hospital, is within the act of 1855." So
is one to a Home for Incurables, the Rush Home for Consumptives, a Blind Institution, a Deaf and Dumb Institution," to a
Home for aged Colored People,16 to the St. Vincents' Orphan
Asylum, 7 to the Presbyterian Home for Widows and Single
Women, 8 to the Presbyterian' Orphanage, 9 to a Home for the
Friendless, "9 to a Home for Protestant Destitute Women," to the
German Protestant Orphan's Home of West Liberty" to a Home
for Convalescents,' to the St. Joseph's Home for Friendless Boys,
the St. Vincent's Home and the Maternity Hospital. 2
CHURCHES.

Gifts to particular local churches, without designating the
purpose of the gift, will be understood to be designed to main12Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
L32 Super 636. A gift to the Pennsylvania Museum & School of Industrial Art is within the act; Phillips' Estate. i Dist. 311.
"4Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67.
15Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766.
' 6Poulson's Estate, i Phila. 151; Parker's Estate, I4 W. N. C. 566.
'TWittmann's Estate, 9 Dist- 47.
18Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766.
"9Sloan's Appeal, i68 Pa. 422; Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766.
2°Steenson's Estate, 5 Lack. L. N. 163; McAuley's Estate, 45 Pittsb. L.
J. 398.
2
'McAuley's Estate, 45 Pittsb. L. J., 398.
"2Luebbe's Estate, 179 Pa. 447.
nClark's Estate, 52 Pittsb. L. J. i12.
24
Kane's Estate, 185 Pa. 544.
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tain the operations of the church, and must conform to the act of
It was tacitly assumed that a bequest of $1000 to the
1 8 5 5 .'
trustees of a church, to use as much of the income therefrom as
necessary in keeping iii repair the burial lot of the testatrix's
husband, and any excess for the benefit of the church, was within
the act." A chapel is a place of worship, and although the testatrix, in bequeathing $2000 for its erection, imposes her own
name upon it (the Vanzant Chapel) thus intending it to be a
family monument, she must comply with the act of 1855.2"
Yerkes J., observes that "Bdquests for family monuflhents have
repeatedly been held to be charitable." A sunday-school is engaged in the teaching of religion. It also teaches gratuitously
and is for that reason a charity. A gift to a sunday school is
avoided by the death of the testator within a calendar month.'
Various societies, incorporated or not, are more or less closely
connected with churches, and assist in performingreligious work.
A gift to a home and foreign missionary society is within the
operation of the act. - So is a gift to the "Franciscan Brothers
of Altoona."" Anti-religious, or anti-Christian organizations
are religious or charitable, in the sense of the statute, e. g. a corporation called the Friendship Liberal League, whose object was
to hold lectures to propagate notions of religious liberty.'
MASSES.
A man, believing in the efficacy of masses for the repose of

the souls-of the dead. to shorten or alleviate their purgatorial
punishment, may make a gift to a priest for the purpose of procuring masses for himself, or for his wife or friends. Although
some judges have held that the object is a purely personal gain,
and therefore that bequests for it are not subject to the Act of
18552 the supreme court has held them subject to the act. Says
Sterrett, J., "Acccording to the Roman Catholic system of faith,
2McLean v. Wade, 41 Pa. 266; Carnell's Estate, o Phila. 322; Hegarty's
Appeal, 75 Pa. 5o3; Hamilton's Estate, 74 Pa. 69; Parker's Estate, 14 W.
N. C. 566; Ralston's Estate, i Chest. 482; Conway's Estate, io Dist. 509.
26
Hoffner's Estate, x61 Pa. 332.
2Vanzant's Estate, 6 Pa. C. C. 6752Ralston's Estate, r Chest. 482.
2Carl's Appeal, io6 Pa. 635, Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397.
•Hodnett's Estate, 154 Pa. 485.
2t
Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. 500.
:12Power's Estate, 35 Leg. Int. 68; Dougherty's Estate, 12 Phila. 70.
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there exists an intermediate state of the soul, after death and before final judgment, during which guilt incurred during life and
unatoned for, must be expiated; and the temporary punishment
to which the souls of the penitent are thus subjected, may be
mitigated or arrested through the efficacy of the mass, as a propitiatory sacrifice. Hence the practice of offering masses for the
departed. It cannot be doubted that in obeying the injunction
of the testator [the will gave the residue of the estate to the St.
Mary's Catholic Church, "to be expended in masses for the
benefit and repose of my soul"] and offering masses for the
benefit and repose of his soul, the officiating priest would be performing a religious service, and none the less so, because intercession would be specially invoked in behalf of the testator
alone. The service is just the same in kind, whether it be designed to promote the spiritual welfare of one or many. Prayer
fox the conversion of a single impenitent, is as purely a-religions
act as a petition for the salvation of thousands." The saying of
the masses is religious in character.'
The same. result was
reached, where the gift was to "Rev. Richard Kennahan, or
his successors of St. -Matthew's Church,- of Conshohocken,
Pa., for the purpose of saying masses for myself, my now wife,
Ellen, and my deceased wife, Mary." This bequest the court said
was to the legatee "not only as priest of the church named, but
also for a specific use and is thus charged with a trust,".and the
duties to be performed were religious." Tfie state of Pennsylvania can have no opinion as to the existence of purgatorial
pains and as to the virtue of masses, for alleviating them. But
it forbids its subjects from purchasing this virtue, by any arrangement made at precisely that time when the making of such
arrangement is most urgently necessary.
RDUCATION FOR MINISTRY.

A gift to X in trust to expend the income in the education
of a grand-nephew for the Presbyterian ministry, is not for a
religious or a charitable use. It is for the benefit of the young
man. "The church might or might not be benefited," says
Gordon, J., "by having John Edgar for one of its ministers, for
he was not required by the will to act in the ministerial office
after ordination; but I cannot see that the case would have been
"Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142; Kelly's-Estate, 9 Dist. 387; Moran's Estate, 24 Lanc. 70.
3'O'Donnell's Estate, 209 Pa. 63.
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altered had he been required to preach for 50 years after such
ordination, any more than had the requisition been that he
should learn the trade of carpenter and follow it for a livelihood.
The primary object of the donor was to benefit not the church or
the world, but her nephew, and it certainly would be regarded
as a strange thing to announce that the statute in any degree
limited the power of a parent, uncle or aunt to direct by will the
education of a child or other relative." He proceeds to add that
had the gift been to a presbytery, seminary or synod, ion
condition that part of it be used in the education of the young man
for the ministry or any other purpose, it would be for a religious
or charitable use. Apparently then, the character of the trustee
will decide. A gift to X, as trustee for the education of A for
the ministry is not for a religious or charitable purpose. A gift
of the same thing to a college, seminary, synod, presbytery, and
for the same purpose, is for a religious or charitable use!35
GIFTS TO EDITOR OF JOURNAL OF FREE THOUGHT.

A gift to the "editor and proprietor of the Boston Investigator," a paper devoted to the dissemination of free thought respecting religion, the state, etc., is not to a charity or for a religious use, notwithstanding that the reason of the gift is the
donor's sympathy with the donee's propaganda, and the expectation that it will promote that propaganda. The profits of the
enterprise belong to the proprietor."
BURIAL LOT.

A provision for keeping one's own burial lot in a cemetery,
in repair, and to erect a monument within it, is not, says Sittzer,
J., a charity, although the improvement of the lot may improve
the appearance of the rest of the cemetery. 7 A bequest to keep
the graveyard of a church in repair, is a charity.'
BENEFICIAL SOCIETY.

A beneficial society, whose members pay dues, and which
gives weekly benefits to those of them who are sick, and death
benefits to their families, is not a charity. A gift to it by will of
$1,000 by a testratrix whose husband had been a member of it,
35McMillen's Appeal, ii W. N. C. 440.
36Knight's Estate, so Pa. C. C.225. It appearing that one person was

proprietor and another editor, the gift was equally divided between them.
37
M. E. Church v. Gifford, 5 Pa. C. C. 92.
38
Ralston's Estate, i Chest. 482.
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is not within the act of 1855." But the Philadelphia Fire Department Relief Association is a charity. All able-bodied firemen of the Insurance patrol, who are citizens of the state are
eligible to membership in it. Its purpose is to encourage thrift
and afford relief in case of death. A bequest to it must comply
with the provisions of the act of 1855.40 The same was tacitly
assumed of a gift to the St. George's Society, by a member of
it. 41
WHEN DONEE SELECTS OBJECTS TO BE BENEFITED.

A gift to the Right Reverend Bishop Wood, to be appropriated by him to such charitable purposes in connection with
the institutions of the Catholic Church, as shall seem to him
meet and proper, is a charity within the statute,"2 as is a gift to the
executors "to found and maintain such charitable and educational institution or institutions in my name, as they, in their
discretion may deem wise, proper and expedient." 4 '
A SECRET TRUST.

A testator, in order to evade the operation of the act of
1855, or for some other purpose, may make a gift to an individual,
in order that he may administer it for, or pay it over to charities;
and the individual may or may not fall under a duty, enforceable
by the courts, to make the use of the gift which the donor intended. If before the testator's death, B causes A, the testator,
to believe that he, B, will use the gift in the way desired by A,
and thus induces A to make the gift, or having made it, to refrain from revoking it, the gift will be clothed with a trust, and
if the object of this trust is a charitable or religious use, the gift
will be within the scope of the act of 1855. Thus if A's bequest
to B is with the understanding between them, that B shall give
it to the board of foreign missions, the board of home missions,
a Presbyterian church, and a home for incurables, the gifts will
be invalid-unless made more than a calendar month before A's
death." The evidence that B has this understanding with A,
should be clear, precise and undubitable. If it is not, the alleged
:"gSwift v. Beneficial Society, 73 Pa. 362, Jeanes' Estate, 14 Pa. C.C. 617.

"°Jeanes' Estate, 14 Pa. C. C.

617.

"Salt's Estate, 8 Dist. 325.

4tLynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422.
43

Moore's Estate, 198 Pa. 61r.

4"Carlisle's Estate, 3 Dist. 153; Conway's Estate, 1o Dist. 509.
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t rust will not be recognized.45 The fact that the testator selects
B as a legatee, in order that B may, and in the expectation that
B will, use the money given in a certain way, B having no knowledge of the gift to him and having in no way induced it, will not
impose a trust on B. The gift will be valid, although, when informed of it, B intends, and expresses the intention, to use it as
the testator desired. 6 Even the expression in the will of the desire of the testator that the legatee will-use the gift in a certain way,
will not subject it to the act of 1855, if this expression imposes
no enforceable duty. A testator gave one-half of his estate to
Rev. E. McNhelis, saying that, upon the payment of it to him,
"I earnestly request and desire that he will say three masses a
week for the repose of my soul for one year after such payment
This it was held, imposed no legal duty upon
shall be made."
him,' and the bequest was valid notwithstanding the testator's
death within a month." A bequest to the "pastor of the St.
John's R. C. Church, of Altoona," is not ifisofacto a bequest to
him in trust for the performance of certain religious and charitable functions. If no use'is designated, he takes the gift as any
other individual would have taken it." If there had been an
understanding between -him and the testator that he would employ the gift in certain -modes, he might be compelled to disclose
it, but in the absence of any evidence of such an understanding.
the gift will be valid.
THE KInlD OF TRANSFER.

MONEY.

No-estate, real or j5ersonal, says the act of 1855, shall hereafter be *bequeathed, devised or conveyed" to any-body politic
or person, in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the
"same be done by deed or will, attested by two credible and disinterested witnesses." 'Nearly all the cases that have been considered in the courts have involved the validity of devises or bequests. It is plain however, that transfers duranie vita are as
much contemplated as those taking effect at aeath. Conveyances
are inter'vivos. What is the meaning of the word "conveyance?" The statute clbntemplates conveyan~es of personalty as
well as of realty. A might put personal property worth $100,000
'

'-Carlisle's Estate, 3 D st. 1$3.'
16Schultz's Appeal, 8oPa.396.
"Daugherty's Estate, X2 Phila. 70.
4
Hodnett's Estate, 154 Pa. 485.

Cf White's Estate, 2 W.N.C. 383.
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into the possession of B, with the intention that it should become
B's. That act would become a conveyance. He might adopt
another method. -He might make a writing in which he said
that he assigned and transferred the property to h. That also
would be a conveyance. Could it enter the head of a legislator to
say that the latter would be invalid, but the former valid? That

the validity of a gift wrung from a moribund sinner as a means
of appeasing the Almighty Avenger, should depend on the form
in which it was made? That if the donor sends to the bank and
gets $10,000; and hands- this money over to the priest, the donation shall be unassailable; but if he writes and seals an assignment'of that amount, and delivers -the assignment, it shall be
voidable? Yet, Gordon, J., does not hesitate: to- attribute this
distinction to the legislature. "Had Mary B. Daly, the decedent," he sals, "within one month, or for that matter, within
one day before her death, banded over to the representative of
one or more of the charities mentioned in her will, any sum of
money or piece of personal pioperty, intending to pass it to it or
them as an immediate gift, I suppose it would not be contended
that such gift would come within the prohibition of the 11th section of the Act of April 26th, 1855. Such present donation,
thus fully executed and completed during the life of the donor,
cannot fairly be called either a bequest, devise or conveyance,
within the meaning of the statute." A gratuitious grant today
by A to B, is a "present donation," "fully executed and completed during the life of the donor." Is it for that reason, not
within the terms of the act? What conveyance of land is within
it then? And if a "present donation" of land is within the statutory prohibition, why should not a "present donation" of personalty? Theresult of the distinction is manifest by the case.
Mrs. Daly had devised the residue of her estate to Archbishop
Wood, to be used for charitable purposes. A friend, seeingthat
she was desperately il,. told her that if she should die within 30
days, her bequest .would fail. He suggested that she should.
give a power of attorney to Rev. Mr. Mulholland, to sell her
Philadelphia City Loan, and hand over the proceeds to Arch'McGlade's Appeal, 99 Pa. 338.

This case is said in Lubbe's Estate,

179 Pa. 447, to have been "practically overruled by subsequent decisions
construing the act of 1855," but the only decision of which this might

be said is Iteimensnyder v. Gans, xio Pa. 17, rendered by the same judge,
Gordon, three years later, and which makes no reference to McGlade's
Appeal.
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bishop Wood. She did so. Mr. Mulholland, through Drexel &
Co., sold the loan, and obtained their check for the proceeds
$2718; payable to the order of the Archbishop. This, concluded
the court, was a "present donation" to the Archbishop and valid.
One of the considerations that seem to- have induced Gordon, J.,
thus to partially nullify the statute is that otherwise, there
would be "a period of one calendar month in every person's life,
in which, by no possibility can such person make a present executed gift of any part of his or her money, or other personal assets, to a religious use or other charity." But, it remains true
that there is such a period, during which a man cannot make a
present executed gift of land. The act applies as clearly to
personal as to real estate, nor does it distinguish between money
and other forms of personalty. The justice adverts to the circumstance that there was no trust intervening between that affecting Archbishop Wood, and her own act of gift, as if that
could be significant.
A more serious difficulty than the inability within one's last
month of life to make a gift to charities, is one to which the justice does not refer, viz, that according to the act, a conveyance to
a charitable or religious use at any tine is invalid except by a
deed with attesting witnesses. Conveyances must not only be
made more than a calendar month before death, but even then
they must be made by attested deed. If the act forbids any transfer of any personalty at any time otherwise, a man can never so
give $50 to a church or seminary, that he may not afterwards
recover it back unless he transferred it by a deed.
Justice Gordon suggests that while a conveyance of land to
a charity would be void, unless the conditions of the statute were
complied with, the donor might convey the land for a price, and
hand the price over, and thus virtually give the land. The chief
value of the statute then is, that it confines gifts to money, and
if the donor has not property in the form of money, obliges him
to convert what he has into money.
While apparently, a donor may give money without hindrance from the act of 1855, he cannot.give a bond and mortgage for money, except in conformity therewith. If instead of
so selling the bond, and handing the proceeds to the charity, he
assigns it to X in trust to pay all or some of the proceeds to a
church, the assignment will be void.'
5°McMicbael v. Price, 12 Pa. C.C. 181. Pennypacker takes hold of the

suggestion in McGlade's Appeal, and regards the fact that X receives the
bond in trust as decisive. He also thinks the trust was not to operate until
the testator's death, and that this, in some way is important.
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Apparently, money or chattels may despite th&act of 1855,
be given by A in his lifetime to a charity, provided no writing
is employed in doing so, although a writing is employed in converting a chattel or a chose in action into money, as a preliminary to the gift of the money," and provided that the money or
chattel is not given to one trustee in trust that he shall give it to
the donee who is to administer it as charity.
SUBSCRIPTIONS.

A man may subscribe to a fund for a -church. Will the
act-of 1855 determine whether the subscription is enforceable?
B agreed in uniting to pay to the pastor', "$300, towards the
erection of St. Joseph's Church."
If there vere a consideration
for the promise, such as would make it enforceable a; a contract,
it could possibly be enforceable although it was made within a
calendar month of the promissor's death: -and was not attested
by two witnesses. If it were a mere proihise to make a gift, it
would, independently of the statute, be _revoked' by death. If
there was no "fair valuable consideration" for it, it is'unenforceable under the provision of the act of 1855 concerning property
within a calendar month of death, 52 that is,' a subscription may
be a "conveyance."
EXECUTING POWER OF APPOINTMENT.

If A by will, confers on B a power to appoint by will, and
B appoints by a will executed within~,a calendar month of B's
death, to a charity, the appointment is void, although A died.
more than a calendar month before B's appointment.'
A SEALED PROMISE TO PAY. •

A, desiring to make a bequest of $1000 to the German
Protestant Orphans' Home Society of West Liberty, and advised
that as*-her death was imminent, it would b6 invalid, executed
the following note:
Pittsburg, Oct. 10, 1893.
Three months after date I promise to pay to the German
Protestant Orphans' Home Society -of West Liberty Borough,
Allegheny Co., Pa., $1000. For value received without defalcation.
CAROLINE LUEBBE (Seal).
51
n McGlades' Appeal, 99 Pa. 338, a power of attorney for the sale of
the evidence of debt was executed, with a view to the cenversion of it into
money, and the gift of the money..
52
Reimensnyder v. Gans, i io Pa. 17.
:'Graff's Estate, 16 Dist. 518.
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She delivered this note at once, and in her will, executed
contemporaneously, stated that her estate was subject to the payment of it. She died within a calendar month. It was held that
this was a conveyance of property, in the sense of the act of
1855, and was void, although it was an executed gift. A gratuitous deed of land, would be an executed gift, yet within
the statute, and it makes no distinction between gifts of money
or other personalty, and gifts of land.'
KINDS OF GIFTS AVOIDED.

The gifts which the act of 1855 avoids, may be absolute, or
contingent. A devise being to A for life, remainder to his children or issue if any survive, if none survive, to a charity, the
ulterior gift to the charity is void. 5 Gifts unconditional, but by
way of remainder, are within the statute; e. g. a gift to charities
after life estates given to three sons, and the survivors."
FAIR AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

The act of 1855 contains the proviso that any disposition of
property within the calendar month before death, bona ffde made
for a fair and valuable consideration, shall not be avoided. The
fact that a legacy is made with a view to expenditures to be made
by the legatee, and that these expenditures are later made, in reliance on the bequest, does not constitute this consideration. A
legacy of $2000 is given for the purpose of building a chapel.
The building of this chapel is not the necessary consideration.'
CONCLUSIVENESS

OF PROBATE.

Although the act of 1856 makes the probate of a will, not
appealed from in five years conclusive as to realty this conclusiveness is merely as to the accordan'ce of the execution of the
will with the requirements of the Wills Act of 1833, and as to
the testamentary capacity of the testator and his exemption from
undue influence. It does not bar a contestation of the validity
53Luebbe's Estate, 179 Pa. 447.

In Conway's Estate, io Dist. 5og, the

executed gift of bonds, made by delivery shortly before death to A, as
trustee for a church, was held to be within the operation of the act of x855.
An order by the donor on the custodian of the bond for their delivery to A,
and an effort by A to obtain the possession of them before the donor's
death, were treated as equivalent to a delivery.
54
Lynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422.
5'Moore v. Deyo, 212 Pa. 1o2; Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766; Conley's
Estate, 197 Pa. .91; Kane's Estate, x85 Pa. 544.
16Vanzant's Estate, 6 Pa. C. C. 625.
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of bequests to charities on the ground that the testator died within a calendar month after executing the will.57 Hence, after the
will has been admitted to probate, and while the probate is unreversed, the rights of the legatees or devisees for charitable or
religious uses may be contested, in the proceedings to distribute
the estate,' s by a bill in equity to enjoin the executors from
carrying out the directions of the will respecting the charities59
or to compel them to deliver the property to the heirs or next of
kin' or in an action against the executor, for the legacy. In an
action against an administrator or executor on a subscription,
the validity of the subscription, because not conforming to the
act of 1855, may be attacked. 6
When the will contains nothing
but charitable and religious bequests, 'not even appointing an
executor, it must be probated by two attesting witnesses, and
the register's decree admitting it to probate on proof by two
witnesses of the testator's handwriting will be reversed by the
Orphans' Court."2
THE ATTESTATION.

The will or deed must be attested by two credible and at the
same time disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month
before the decease of the testator or alienor.'
Whether in order
to be an attesting witness, one must subscribe his name as such,
is as yet doubtful.
Hawkins, P. J., quotes with approval
Bouvier's definition of an attesting witness, as "one who, upon
being required by the parties to an instrument, signs his name
to it, to prove it and for the purpose of identification," adding,
"This being the ordinary use of the word, and there being nothing in the act of 1855 inconsistent with it, it must be followed."
He concludes that a will not thus attested, does not comply with
5THegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503; Phillip's Estate, i Dist. 3i; Hupfeld's
Estate, 5 Phila. 219; Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397; Irvine's Estate, 2o6
Pa. x; Evans' Estate, 12 Dist. 694. However, in Combs' Appeal 1o5. Pa.
155, it seems to be assumed that the witnesses who probate a-will containing charitable bequests, must have the qualifications necessary to establish
such wills under the act of 1855.
58Irvine's Estate, 206 Pa. i; Beswick's Estate, 14 Dist. 711.
59Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503; Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292.
6°Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
6

'Reimensnyder v. Gans, zio Pa. 17.
Ralston'e Estate, i Chest. 482.
93jeanes' Estate, 14 Pa. C. C. 617; Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766.
62
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the act.6 A similar view seems to be held by Penrose, J., who
remarks, "Attestation is simply the 'authentication of the instrument by the requisite number of witnesses' (Lewis v. Lewis, 6
S. & R. 489) and 'Attesting witnesses are regarded in the law as
persons placed around the testator, in order that no fraud may
be practiced upon him in the execution of the will, and to prove
his competency,' 2 Greenleaf, on Evidence par. 691. In using
technical words or expressions, the legislature, in the absence of
evidence of contrary intent, is presumed to use them in their
ordinary technical sense." He speaks of the witnesses attesting,
when he evidently means, subscribing their names.'
On the
other hand, it is sometimes assumed that a witness may attest
without subscribing. "Unless," says Thompson, P. J., "the
witnesses be present, [i. e. at the execution of the will] they
cannot attest or bear witness to the fact. Even though they do
not sign as subscribing witnesses, they must be able to prove
that the execution of the instrument was perfected in their presence.

'

,6

It is clear that simply subscribing one's name to a will does
not make one an attesting witness. He must subscribe at the
tippe of the execution of the will by the testator, or, if after, at
the request of the testator, and upon his acknowledgement that
the will is his. One who, at the instance of A, writes his will in
his absence, and who subscribes his name, as a witness, and then
sends the will by mail to A, who subsequently executes it, is not
an attesting witness. Nor is one such a witness who later subscribes his name, but cannot say when the testator signed the
will, or whether it was already signed when he put his name on
it as witness. Although subscribing, these are not attesting
witnesses." "To attest or witness the will," says Mestrezat, J.,
4

Gray's Estate, r47 Pa. 67. The witnesses had subscribed, in Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397.
65Beswick's Estate, 13 Dict. 711. In Phillip's Estate, i Dist. 3ii he re-

paired from deciding whether the witnesses must subscribe. In Taylor's
Estate, 16 Phila. 274, he thought that subscription was unnecessary. "An
attesting witness is not necessarily a subscribing witness. To attest is
simply to bear witness to. The English- Wills Act x Vict. c. 26, sec. 9, pro-

vides that the witnesses shall "attest and stibscribe" to the will in the presence of the testator. The act of 1855 requires attestation only, and is silent
with regard to subscription."
"6Hupfeld's Estate, 5 Phila. 9ig;Ralston's Estate, i Chest. 482.
6
1Irvine's Estate, 2o6 Pa. i. Trunkey J. intimates a doubt whether the
will must be subscribed by the witnesses. Combs' Appeal, 1o5 Pa. x55.
He also says that it is unnecessary that the testator should declare to the
witnesses, that the instrument is.his w4l]. In Steenson's Estate, 5 Lack.
L. N. 163 the court did not decide whether the witnesses must subscribe.
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"the witness must be present when the writing is signed and
thereby becomes a will, or, the testator may, after he has affixed
his signature, acknowledge it to be his act in the presence of the
witnesses." When two subscribing witnesses admit, in the distribution proceedings, that they attested at the testator's request,
the fact that one of them, though believing that the will had already been signed, when he attested, cannot -positively recollect
the facts, and the other, who signed later, had an impression that
when he thus signed the testator had not already signed the will,
the attestation clause declaring that the will had been signed before it was witnessed, will not require the rejection of the charitable bequest. 8' It is not necessary that the attesting witness
should have read the will or heard it read to him"' or have had
its contents communicated to him by the testator. 70 All that the
witnesses need to prove is the identity of the instrument, that
they saw the testator subscribe it or make his mark to it, and
that he was of sound and disposing mind."'
WHEN THE ATTESTATION TAKES PLACE.

The attestation is not the proof made at the probate of the

will, or in the proceeding in which the estate is undergoing distribution to legatees, or in any litigation for the recovery of a
devise or grant. It must precede the death of the testator or
alienor, by at least a calendar month. The attestation, no less
than the execution of the will or deed, must precede this month.
THE WITNESSES.

The witnesses, two in number at least, must be "credible
and at the same time disinterested." A credible witness says
Trunkey, J., "is one who is not disqualified to testify by mental
incapacity, interest, crime, or other cause.""' A disinterested wit6SBeswick's Estate, 13 Dist. 71i.
9Beswick's Estate, 13 Dist. 71.

Cf. Paxson's Estate, 16 Dist. 364,

where it is held by Penrose, J., that the attesting witnesses 'must both
identify the will as that which the testator asked them to witness. The
witnesses must be credible at the time of attestation.
I0Combs' Appeal, xo5 Pa. '55.
7'Combs' Appeal, io5 Pa. 155.
aGray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67.
72
Combs' Appeal, io5 Pa. x55. He intimates that it is not necessary
that the character of the witnesses for truth must be good. But even if
that is necessary, it will be presdmed until the witnesses have been im-

peached.
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ness is "one who has no legal interest."'' and, quoting Greenleaf,
Sterrett, C. J., says, "The true test of the interest of a witness
is that he will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment or that the record will be legal evidence for or against him, in some other action. It must be a
present, certain and vested interest, and not an interest uncertain,
remote or contingent.'I"74 One named as executor in the will,
and who has acted as such, but whose compensation will not be
increased by the establishment of the charitable bequest or devise, is disinterested,75 as is also a servant of the institution to
which the bequest is made, he not having a certain, only a possible, benefit from the establishment of the bequest" and as is a
contributor to the charitable institution, or even a member of it, 7
or a legatee in an earlier will of the testator, which is superseded
by the will in question." When a will has been probated upon
the testimony of two subscribing witnesses, at the instance of X,
a legatee, it will not be necessary, in the distribution proceeding,
to prove as against X, that the witnesses were credible and disinterested, otherwise than by the record of the probate when in
that record is nothing to suggest the want of conformity to the
act of 1855. That is~primafade proof of the due execution of
the will."
TIMB OFIMMXEUTION.

The devise or conveyance must be "done by deed or will, attested by two credible and at the same time disinterested witnesses, at least one'calefidar month before the decease of the testator.or alienor." Although a will does not operate until death,
this act requires its physical execution to precede by a calendar
month, that event and deeds, conveying to charity although they
operate before death, must, in order to remain valid, not be followed within the month, by the grantor's death;' that is, deeds
though absolute and immediate in operation, are subject to a
"Combs' Appeal, xo5 Pa.

155.

4

Jordan's Estate, x61 Pa. 393.
75Jordan's Estate, x6x Pa. 393.
"

"Combs' Appeal, 1o5 Pa. '55.
"Evans' Estate, 12 Dist. 694.
"Combs' Appeal, f05 Pa. 155.
19Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397.
8
Carl's Appeal, io6 Pa. 635.
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species of condition subsequent. A date is not necessary to a
will 8 or deed, and the actual time of its execution can be proved
despite its omission, or, doubtless, despite the presence in it of a
false date.
A CALENDAR

MONTH.

Months of various sorts are spoken of, lunar, solar, calendar.
The calendar month is variously defined. It is "one of the 12
82
parts into which the calendar year is arbitrarily divided," Calendar months are of "unequal length according to the Julian
division of our common almanacs, commencing at the calends of
"A
each month, whereof in a year there are only twelve....
calendar month," says Brown, J., is not one of any given number of days throughout the entire year, but varies in length according to the Gregorian calendar. A calendar month beginning
in February, except in leap year, is of 28 days' duration; one
beginning in April, June, September or November is of 30 days,
and one beginning in either of the other seven months, of 31
If a calendar month is one of the twelve, January, Febdays" '
ruary, March, April, etc., a plausible interpretation of the
statute of 1855 would require that one of these months, (not a
number of days, some in one and others in another month),
should intervene between the execution of the will and the death
of the testator. If a will were made January 26th, under this
interpretation, the testator must not die until February had
passed, if the charitable bequest was to be held valid. This view
has not been adopted. By caleidar month is meant, it is assumed, not a calendar month, but a number of days equal to
those in some calendar month. But we have just been instructed by Mr. Justice Brown, that the calendar months are unequal
case in the number of their days. Which of them then is, in any
to furnish the number? That, says Brown, J., which is to elapse
between the execution of the will or deed and the death of the
If the will is executed ig October, that
testator or grantor.'
month must elapse before the death. That month has 31 days,
therefore 31 days must elapse before the death. But, suppose
8

Evans' Estate, 12 Dist. 219. The date may be added below the signature without impairing the will.
82
Century Dict.; Standard Dict.
832 Bl. Comm. 14T; Wittmann's Est., 9 Dist. 47.
84

Gregg's Estate, 213 Pa. 26o.

85Gregg's Estote, 213 Pa. 26o.
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the will written in January. January has 31 days. Therefore
31 days must elapse before the death. It matters not how early
or how late in the month the will is written, the number of days
is not altered by differences of that sort. Let then, the will be
written on January 31st. If 31 days must elapse, before the
death, the death dare not occur before March 4th; that is, two
months must have elapsed, since the execution of the will.
THn DAYS.

There must, according to Gregg's Estate, lie between the
execution of the will or deed and the death of the testator or
grantor, not a space of time equal in length to the combined
length of so many days, but so many days each of which extends
from midnight to midnight. If the will is written at 4 o'clock
p.m. of October 8th, 1899, and the death occurs on November
8th, 1899 at 8 o'clock p.m., thirty-one times 24 hours, and four
hours additional will have elapsed, but only 30 days from midnight to midnight, plus 8 hours of October 8th, and 20 hours of
November 8th. If then a will is executed on January 12th at
whatever hour, even five minutes after 12 a. m., 31 whole days
must elapse after the close of January 12th, before, not the death,
but the beginning of the day. on which the death occurs. After
January 12th there will be 19 days in that month. The death
must not occur therefore sooner than some time on February
13th.8" We may pause here to adore the wisdom which has discovered that if a man writes a will in February he has been free
from danger of improper influence, if he does not die in 28 days,
whereas, if he writes it in the month before or after, he will not
862i3

Pa. 260.

87

1t had been held that the will executed February 27 th, a death on
March 28th did not impair the bequest, Parker's Estate, 14 W. N. C. 566; a
will executed February 12th, the bequest was not invalidated by death on
the same day of the next month, March izth Wittmann's Estate, 9 Dist. 47.

The contrary of this had been held in Simpson's Estate, 37 Pittsb. L. J.
492; The bequest was held invalid, when the will being executed August
21st, the death occurred September 20th. Leisenring's Estate, 5 Dist. 232;
Carnell's Estate, 9 Phila. 322; Socks' Estate, x5 Super. 281; In Eldred's Estate, 5 Forum, 2o8, a death on the same day of the following month, but at
an earlier hour than that of the execution of the will was held to avoid the
bequest. In Downey's Estate, io Forum, 132, the death having occured on
the same day of the following month, as that of the execution of the will
in the preceding month, it was held incumbent on the legatee to show the
exact hours.
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be safe unless his death is postponed at least.31 days. There is
something in February which somewhat fortifies, the mind of
testators choosing that blessed month- for the execution of their
wills, from the sinister machinations of priests and the perturbations of superstition.
WHAT MUST BE DEEMED THE DATE OQ THE DEVISE.

The act of 1855 requires that the bequest or devise for charitable or religious uses shall be "done" by will at least one calendar month before the donor's death. A will may be composed
of different testamentary instruments, of a so-called "willi" and
one or more codicils, and the donation being in the earlier will,
may be more or less affected by the later codicil. If the codicil
is made within, a calendar month prior to the testator's death,
and the will which -it is conceived to modify was made before
the month, which of the instruments is to be deemed the "will,"
in the sense of the statute ?
WHEN THE CODICIL REVOKES THE WILL.

When the codicil revokes the will, the latter ceases to exist.
No bequests in it operate. The charity must claim, if at all,
under the codicil. So, if the codicil revokes such parts of the
will, as make disposition for charitable or religious purposes, the
charities must rely up6n" the codicil. If it is mad within the
calendar month preceding the testator's death, the'gifts are void.
The purpose of the testator to revoke the will may be distinctly
expressed in the codicil.'
It may also be displayed by the fact
that the second will or codicil undertakes to dispose of all 'the
testator's estate, or of the parts disposed of by'tlieearlier will. 9
The fact that the codicil makes exactly similar charitable dispositions as the will, will not prevent the revocation of the
earlier." The revocation is clearer, if there is a modification .of
the terms of the bequest; if, e. g., in the original will, the bequest is for the "benefit of the missionary funds" of the church,
and in the codicil for the' benefit of the home missions of the
church 9' or if different executors 'are appointed' or if the sec"Appeal of Lutheran Congregation, x13 Pa. 32; Teacle's'Estate, x53
Pa. 219; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
"Price v. Maxwell, z8 Pa. 23.
"Hoffner's Estate, i6i Pa. 331; Tead's Estate, 153 Pa. 2X9.
"Appeal of Lutheran Congregation, 113 Pa..32.
9Teacles' Estate, 153 Pa. 2tg; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
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ond will devotes to the same charity all the property devoted to
it in the first and more." While a second will; or a codicil which
is not executed as the law requires for wills, genertlly, cannot
even revoke an earlier will, if complying with the general law of
wills, it is vulnerable merely because, giving property for charitable or religious uses, it does not observe the requirements of
the act of 1855,,it will revoke the earlier will though its provisions for charities cannot be carried out."
WHEN CODICIL' DOES NOT REVOKE.

It is possible for a codicil or second will not to revoke the
earlier or those parts of the earlier which make bequests to
charities. The first will e. g. after giving bequests to relatives,
gives the residue of the estate to the Home and Foreign Missionary Society of the U. B. Church. A codicil made 4 years later,
which simply increases the bequests to the relatives, and so
diminishes the residue, is not a revocation of the earlier will, or
a republication of it, so as to make the bequest date from the
making of the codicil.95 When the codicil neither increases nor
reduces the charitable bequests of the will, but simply makes
them a charge upon the residuary estate; the bequests date from
the will.' Even the presence of a clause of revocation in the
codicil is not always decisive that the will is by it revoked. The
will made as the act of 1855 requires gave $7000 to the Presbyterian Orphanage of the State of Pennsylvania. A codicil "annulled and revoked" this bequest, and "instead thereof" gave
the same sum to a trustee, who should invest it during the lives
of A and B, and pay the interest on $5000 to A during' his life,
and the interest on $2000 to B during his life, and at the death
of these persons, should pay the principal to the Orphanage,
that is, it postponed the payment to the Orphanage. The gift
was valid. 5 A revocation in a codicil made within a month of the
testator's death, of the gift followed by a bequest to the same
charities of a less amount, will not impair the gift, to the extent
mentioned in the codicil.9" The original gift to the "Home for
93
Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
94
Hoffner's Estate, x61 Pa. 331; Appeal of Lutheran Congregation, 113
Pa. 32;
Teacles' Estate, 153 Pa. 219; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
95
Carl's Appeal, io6 Pa. 635.
96Leisenring's Estate, 5 Dist. 232.
91Sloin's Appeal, 168 Pa. 4z.
9
Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 484; Poulson's Estate, ii Phila. xix; Salt's
Estate, 8 Dist. 325.
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Aged and Infirm Colored Persons," was of $1000. A codicil
made within a month before the testator's death, said "I revoke
the gift of $1000 to the Old Man's Home, and change it to $500."
The gift of $500 was valid." The original will gave certain annuities, and upon the death of the annuitants, all of the estate to
the St. George's Society. A codicil revoked'the annuities, and
gave the estate to others than the Society, but directed that the
testator's share in the stock of the Society worth $1000, be given
to the Society. This was treated as a mere reduction of the bequest.'
CONDITIONAL WILLS.

A second will or codicil may be made, by its own language,
or by a still later codicil, conditional upon the testator's living
more than a month after its execution, and it or the later codicil
may provide that if the second will or codicil fails to operate, the
former will shall stand. A will was written November 20th,
1871, and another January 13th, 1873., A codicil to the last
provided that if the testator should die before March 1st, 1873,
the instrument of November .20th, 1871 should be the will. The
testator dying before that date, the charitable bequests in the
will of 1871 had effect.' But, from the mere fact that the bequests in the second will or codicil are avoided by the act of
1855, it cannot be legitimately inferred that the testator intended
to make its operation contingent upon his surviving for a month.'
WILLS IN EXECUTION OF A TRUST.

If A has devised his, property to B, on B's undertaking to
devise it to charities, by means of which undertaking he induces
A to refrain from changing the devise, a devise by B to these
charities of this or equivalent property will be valid, though
made within a calendar month of B's death or, rather, the trust,
affecting the property, will be enforced by awarding the property
to these charities, in proceedings to distribute B's estate, precisely as if the devise were valid. "The money," says Dean, J.,
"goes to the church not by the will, but because there is no
valid will, when there ought to have been one; it is a right of
the church, for whose benefit the promise was made, to insist on
9

Poulson's Estate, ix Phila. 151.
'Salt's Estate, 8 Dist. 325.
2-Iamilton'a Estate, 74 Pa. 69; Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa. 219.
3Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
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the fulfilment of the obligation in a court of equity, in whose
hands is the fund and before whom are all parties in interest."'
WAIVER OF THE ACT.

From the principle that the act of 1855 is designed to protect heirs and next of kin, or residuary legatees and devisees from
the reduction of the testator's estate through improper influences
exerted upon him, it has been held that these parties may waive
the act. They may do this without intending to do it, as by
putting the charities to the trouble and expense of the probating
of the will, against allegations of testamentary incapacity and undue influence.' But declarations by the residuary legatees of
their intentions to carry out the testator's wishes, not made in
the distribution proceeding and for the purpose of ihducing the
auditor or court to award the money to the legatees, are not a
sufficient reason for thus awarding it. They can pay it over,
after it is awarded to them; if they so desire6 or they can direct
the executor to pay the money over to the charity, out of the
money awarded to them.' Failure to object to a distribution to
the charity will not preclude an exception to the adjudication
which awards the gift to it.s
WHO TAKES THE PROPERTY.

The act of 1855 makes all dispositions of property contrary
to its provisions, void and directs that the property "shall go to
the residuary legatee or devisee, next of kin or heirs according
to law." This expression means "to one or the other," that is,
to residuary legatee or heir, "as the case may be under the existing law of distribution." 9 If the chafity receives a determinate legacy or a devise, which is void, it will pass under the will
as a part of the residuary estate, if there is a residuary devise or
bequest.'" If the bequest or devise which fails is of the residue,
'Hoffner's Estate, 161 Pa. 331. A written acknowledgment by B, a
devisee of land that he has received it in trust to devote it at his death to
charities, although not attested by two witnesses, renders the trust enforceable. McAuley's Estate, 45 Pittsb. L. J. 398.
5
Baugb's Estate, 12 Dist. 303; Craige's Estate, 14 Dist. 766.
6
jeanes' Estate, 14 Pa. C. C. 617.
7
Vanzant's Estate, 6 Pa. C. C. 625.
8

Kelly's Estate, 9 Dist. 387.
Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67.
0
' Hoffner's Estate, x6r Pa. 331; Steenson's Estate, 5 Lack. L,N. 163.

9
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it goes to the next of kin or heir, under the intestate law." If
the residue is given in certain ratios to some who can take, and
to charities which cannot take, the shares of the charities will
not pass to the other members of the class of residuary legatees,
a failing
but to the next of kin." If there is no residuary gift,
1
bequest to a charity will pass under the intestate law. 3
"Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142; Carl's Appeal, io6 Pa. 635; McMillen's
Appeal ii W. N. C. 440; Hodnett's Estate, 154 Pa. 485; Alter's Estate, 4
Pa. C. C. 558; Lynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422; Moore v. Deyo, 212 Pa. io2;
Conley's Estate, 197 Pa. 291; Steenson's Estate, 5 Lack. L. N. 163.
"Gray's Estate, '47 Pa. 67.
13Hagarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503.
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MOOT COURT.
TEAL v. 5YPHERD.
Payment by Check Conditional. Makers of a Lost Check Must Be
Indemnified Before Assumpsit on Debt Can Be Brought.
STATEMENT OF THF CASE.
Teal having a claim of $1500 against Sypherd, requested that he send
a check for that amount by mail. The letter containing it was never
obtained by Teal. It was payable to Teal or order, and could be collected
by another, only after Teal's endorsement. After notifying Sypherd
that the check had not been received, and demanding payment otherwise,
Sypherd refusing unless he was indemnified against any possible claim
upon the check, Teal brought this assumpsit, not on the lost check but
upon the debt.
Jones, C. A. for Plaintiff.
Payment by check is conditional. Thompson v. The Bank of North
America, 82 N. Y. 9. McIntyre v. Kennedy et al, 29 Pa. 448. Hunter
v. Moul, 98 Pa. 16. Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 240.
KMnard for Defendant.
Defendant was entitled to indemnity.
5, p. 1078.

Am. and Eng. Encyc., Vol.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
OLMSTED, J:-Each side of this case has been remarkably well
presented by the attorneys, and evidence is given of careful search of
the authorities on either side, but the prevailing law seems to be with
the plaintiff. The attention of the court was to the principle of law,
enunciated in Thompson v. The Bank of British North America, 85 N. Y.
1, that "a party paying his own debt by a check to the order of his
creditor, or of a party nominated by his creditor, can be called upon to
pay it again, in case the creditor loses or is defrauded of the check, and
it is paid to the finder or fraudulent holder, on a forged indorsement,
except in a case, if such a one could be supposed, where the check was
Meeting
taken in absolute payment and extinguishment of the debt."
this proposition, the defendant argued that the direction of Teal to
Sypherd to send him, by mail, a check for the amount of the debt, was
an agreement to receive the check in absolute payment; that when the
check was mailed it became the property of Teal, the plaintiff, and thus
satisfied the debt and released the defendant from liability thereon; and,
if at all, he could be compelled to draw a new check, or make payment
otherwise, only after he had been given indemnity against possible
claims upon the check thus given.
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Let us consider these arguments separately. It is probably true that
had Sypherd sent money to Teal by mail, in accordance with the latter's
direction, a loss of this, in the mails or otherwise, would have devolved
upon Teal, and Sypherd would have been relieved of his indebtednes.
But that such is true in the case of a check thus lost does not seem to be
the law, as will appear later.
Suffice it now to observe that when
,money thus disappears, the funds of ihe debtor have been reduced by so
much, but that when it is a cheek which is lost, there is no diminution of
the funds until it is found and.entered against his account.
Hence,
he may well be treated until then as having made no payment of his
debts.
As to whether the check, when forwarded, became absolute payment,
the law appears plainly in our Pennsylvania decisions that "when a check
on a bank is given, in the ordinary course of business, it is not to be
presumed to be received in absolute payment of a debt, even if the
drawer has funds in the bank, but only a means whereby the holder may
procure the money."
(McIntyre v. Kennedy, Child's & Co., 29 Pa. St.
448.) "Unless there was a special agreement to the contrary, the mere
acceptance of a check would be conditional and not absolute payment."
(Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 240, Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68.) There are
two classes of cases in which acceptance of a check has apparently been
treated as taking it in absolute payment. The first of these is where in
the course of business the creditor has uniformly treatedcheckg aspayment.
This is illustrated in Kenyon v. K. T. &M. M. A. Association, 122 N. Y.
247, in which mailing a check before the time of lapse of an insurance
policy was considered as payment of the premium, even though cash was
not obtained on the check until some time after the date at which the
policy would have lapsed. Then, too, in Briggs'v. Holmes, 118 Pa. 283,
the court said: "Where there is evidence of a course of dealing in which
checks were uniformly accepted as cash, such evidence, tending to rebut
the presumption of conditional payment, raises a question of fact which
should be submitted to the jury." The lack of any'evidence of such circumstances in the case at hand preeludes a decision that the check was
taken as absolute payment on the ground above set forth.
The second
class of cases where the forwarding of a check, or draft, according to
directions,, has been treated as absolute discharge of indebtedness is
where,' though the check has been lost by the payee,, or stolen from him,
or never reached him, yet it has been cashed by the drawee and charged
against the account of the drawer. A strong example of this has been
cited by the defendant, in Jung v. Second Ward Savings Bank, 35 Wis.
364. A similar case, also is Kuntz v. Thompson, 3 Forum, 141, but in
this case the court observes: "There is no presumption that check is
taken in payment unless and until it is actually paid." It is evident
therefore that the case at hand does not fall within the second class of
cases of absolute payment.
Setting aside this view, then, as inapplicable, let us consider the
questioncas-to whether it was necessary for the plaintiff to give indemnity, before demanding payment.
It appears that ofttimes when a
negotiable instrument has disappeared indemnity muat be given the
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maker before another may be demanded, but the American and English
Encyclopedia (Vol. 19, p. 566) states that instruments not transferable
by delivery alone are exceptions to this rule. Among the cases there
cited is an Ohio case (Citizens National Bank v. Brown, 45 Ohio 39), in
which an unindorsed certificate of deposit is brought within the exception.
Clearly a check must also be an exception to the rule requiring indemnity.
The drawer has not lost his control over it when he has parted with
its possession for there is no question but that he can stop payment
thereon at any time beford the payee has parted with it for value, if not,
indeed, at any time before, its acceptance by the drawee. German
National Bank v. Farmers' Deposit National Bank, 118 Pa. 294. It
would seem that nothing more is required here to save Sypherd from
future claim on the lost check. Such action will ffectively prevent Teal
from collecting the check from Sypherd's account, should the check subsequently come into Teal's possession. The bank paying the check after
such notice would itself be liable for the amount and could not charge it
to the drawer's account. Hence it does not appear that any particular
advantage would accrue to Sypherd by the giving of indemnity to him,
while this would, in a degree, handicap the financial operations of Teal
or his sureties. It does not seem, therefore, that Sypherd has a satisfactory defense to his action. Since the check has been lost, the plaintiff could not very well bring action upon that, and yet he is clearly
entitled to recover the amount of this debt. We believe that this action
was the proper method to attain that end, and, since no adequate
defense has been interposed, hereby render judgment for the plaintiff in
the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, with interest.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
We are to assume that the jury might find that Sypherd had, in
compliance with Teal's. request, sent to Teal a check, drawn upon
Sypherd's bank deposit. If this check was negotiable, and was in fact
endorsed by Teal, and passed by him to a bona fide holder, that holder
would be able to present it to the bank, and obtain the money upon it.
This payment, however, Sypherd could prevent, by notifying the bank
not to honor it.
There is one result, however, which could not be so easily prevented.
Although the bank might be able, and even under a duty, to refuse payment of the check, the bona fide holder thereof, would, the bank not
paying, have a right of action against the drawer of it, Sypherd. If
Sypherd is compelled to pay Teal, while the check is outstanding, he may
also be compelled to pay the holder of the check. It is true that the
check could be negotiated only through the endorsement of the payee,
Teal, and that, if Teal did not receive the check, he has not endorsed it.
But how is Sypherd supposed to know that Teal has not endorsed it?
Teal swears that he did not, and the jury in this case, may believe him;
i.e. may believe that he has not endorsed it. But their verdict and the
judgment thereupon, would not avail Sypherd if, the check having been
endorsed, in fact, the endorsee should subsequently sue Sypherd onit.
The holder not being a party to the present action, could not be estopped,
or in any way affected, by the decision herein reached. Sypherd cannot
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be compelled to take the risk of the truth or falseness of Teal's testimony,
however Teal may persuade the present jury of its truth. Sypherd ought
to be indemnified against the possible necessity of having to pay the
check to some innocent holder. Beaver Valley Lodge v. First National
Bank of Beaver Falls, 7 Super. 552; Barclay v. Coal and Navigation Co.,
33 Super. 214.
It is true that a check or note, given to a creditor by a debtor is not
for that reason, merely to be deemed final payment. But if the check is
given, at the request of the creditor, he cannot sue upon the original debt
before making an unsuccessful use of the checks or before entitling himself, in case of its loss before presentment, to another check, or to payment otherwise. The present action is not upon the lost check, as it
might have been, but upon the original indebtedness. The plaintiff is not
entitled, in a suit upon either to recover, unless he has indemnified the
debtor against the possible necessity of a double payment.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BAN'< v. TOMLINSON.
Promissory Note- Negotiability -Admission of Parol EvidenceNotice to a Corporation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Tomlinson executed a note, payable to the Crystal Manufacturing
Company, a corporation, for $1,000, the price of 20 shares of stock. The
note, negotiable, was endorsed by the Company to the bank.
Three of the directors of the bank were also directors of the Company.
The defence is that when Tomlinson subscribed for the stock and
gave the note, the directors agreed that he neel not pay it or keep the
stock, unless he succeeded in selling shares he held in another corporation
and that he had not yet succeeded in selling these shares, notwithstanding
assiduous efforts. The court entered judgment for want of sufficient
affidavit of defence.
Edwards, for the Plaintiff.
Notice to a director not notice to the corporation. Clark on Corp. p.
488; Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 451; Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Courtney,
186 U. S.342.
Miss Jacobs, for the Defendant.
Parol evidence admissible to defeat a recovery on a written instrument, Clark on Corp. p. 282; Miller v. R. R. Co. 87 Pa. 95.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BENNER, J.-Judgment was entered below for want of sufficient
affidavit of defence. We are called upon to decide upon the sufficiency
of the affidavit.
An affidavit of defence in order to be sustained must be sufficient in
two respects: It must allege sufficient facts in detail to show that the
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defendant can establish a defence, and that defence must be sufficient in
law to overcome the plaintiff's prima facie case, as made out by the
copies, averments and presumptions properly to be considered by the
court. Endlich on Affidavits of Defence, page
Does the affidavit in this case meet these requirements? Does it
allege sufficient facts in detail to show that the defendant can establish
a defence, and is it sufficient in. law to overcome the plaintiff's prima
facie case? We believe not. The note, negotiable, was given by Tomlison to the Crystal Manufacturing Company with a condition precedent
attached, viz: That he should succeed in selling shares which he held in
another corporation. The Crystal Manufacturing Co. endorsed this note
to the Bank, the plaintiff in this case. Three of the directors of the
Bank were also directors of the Crystal Manufacturing Co. As directors
of the Crystal Manufacturing Co. they knew of the existence of the note
and of its endorsement to the Bank and were also aware of the fact
that there was a condition precedent attached to the note. Did the
Bank or did it not have notice through these three directors of this condition precedent? If it did not it then became a bona fide holder for
value of the negotiable note and Tomlinson would have no defence.
Wood's Byles on Bills and Notes, p. 166. If it did have notice we believe
the affidavit to be sufficient. We believe the Bank did not have notice
of the condition precedent.
Directors of a corporation are the agents of the corporation, and the
general rule is that notice to the agent is notice to the principal. In
the case of directors of a corporation, however, this rule is qualified. In
the Bank of U. S. vs. Davis, 2 Hill 451, the court said: "Notice to a
director, or knowledge derived by him while not engaged officially in the
business of the Bank cannot and should not operate to the prejudice of
the latter. The relation of principal and agent strictly speaking exists
only while the agent is acting in the business thus delegated to him."
In National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill 572, a bank director read in the
newspaper of a dissolution of partnership which was of great importance
to the bank on account of a note of the partnership then held by the
bank. In a suit growing out of this note and where the question of
notice to the bank was of great importance it was held that notice to
this director in the above stated manner was not notice to the bank.
The court said if this director had been "renewal agent generally or for
this one note, the notice of the dissolution might have effected the bank,
not as notice to the director, but as an agent representing the bank in a
particulardepartment of business;" and in Fulton Bank vs. Benedict, 1
Hall 480, the court said: "I think that under some circumstances notice
to a director ought to charge the corporation, as when the directoracts in
any particularbusiness as the special agent of the bank," implying that
a special agency is necessary. From these authorities we think we may
safely conclude that notice to these three directors was not notice to the
bank and that the bank became by the endorsement of the Crystal Manufacturing Co. a bonafide holder for value without notice. The affidavit
of defence, then setting forth this condition precedent as a bar to a recovery does not meet the requisites of a sufficient affidavit of defence
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set forth in the beginning. It does not allege sufficient facts to show
that a defence can be established, and it is not sufficient in law to overcome the plaintiff's primafacie case as made out by the copies, averments and presumptions properly to be considered by the court. We
therefore deem the affidavit insufficient and the action of the lower
court is affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The defence is, that when Tomlinson subscribed for the stock, and
gave the note on which suit is brought, the Crystal Manufacturing Company agreed that he need not pay the note or keep the stock unless he
suceeded in selling shares he held in another corporation.
The note was an unconditional written promise to pay $1,000 to the
Manufacturing Company or order. Is it competent to show the additional, and in the writing unexpressed, agreement. The decisions on the
permissible uses of parol evidence in conjunction with written contracts
are numberless and to a perplexing degree vague and incoherent. It is
not necessary here to attempt to harmonize them, nor to justify, of
inconsistent decisions, the selection of some, and the rejection of others.
As the law from time to time is the potential purpose of the courts, it is
enough to say that we consider that the courts, if in the near future
required to decide the question, would decide that in the absence of
evidence of fraud or mistake, or of an agreement not to enforce the
writing according to its tenor, the parol agreement could not be shown,
even in an action by the original payee. Hacker v. National Oil Refining
Co, 73 Pa. 93; Clarke v. Allen, 132 Pa. 40; 6 P. & L. Dig. Dec. 10162;
Anspach v. Bast, 52 Pa. 356; Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536.
Had the
action been by the Manufacturing Company, the defendant could not have
set up the alleged parol understanding. He can still less set it up against
the company's endorsee.
The learned court below has limited its view to the question whether
the plaintiff bank was a purchaser of the note upon which it sues, without
notice of the parol agreement. That note is in form negotiable.
The
agreement qualifying the obligation created by it, could not be set up
against a bona fide purchaser for value. The affidavit of defence avers
no other notice than that implied in the fact that three of the directors
of the bank were also directors of the Crystal Manufacturing Company.
It is not said in the affidavit, that the three directors mentioned were
present when the arrangement with Tomlinson was made, or that this
arrangement was ever reported to them, or that they were at the meetof the board at which any action upon the stock subscription was taken.
If the board consisted of seven or nine directors, as it may, it is possible
that these three directors had no actual knowledge of the transaction
with Tomlinson. If they had not, to the bank, of which they were likewise directors, could not from that circumstance be imputed knowledge.
When a corporation acts through a board of directors, knowledge of a
fact by one of this board, is not be regarded as knowledge by the board.
It must appear that the knowing member communicated his knowledge
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to the others. Nor can we rely on the presumption that he would communicate this knowledge, for his corporation would be in a better situation if he did not impart it, than if he did, and if any presumption is to
be indulged, it will be that he acted for its advantage; not for its disadvantage. Knowledge by one director of a bank, of fraud affecting a
note which its board discounts, will not affect the bank. Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490; Huffcut, Agency, 154 (1st ed.) that is, there is no
presumption that one director informs his fellow directors of the facts
which he knows.
So far as appears, therefore, the three directors
of the Manufacturing Company, had no knowledge of the parol agreement.
Let us, however, assume that they had this knowledge. Would it
follow that this knowledge must be attributed to the bank? We have
already said that we cannot assume that they revealed their knowledge
to the other directors if any, of the bank.
If there were seven or nine
directors, their knowledge is not to be imputed to the rest. So far as
appears, they may not have been present when the discount was made.
They may even have opposed it.
The knowledge the three directors obtained, they obtained when
they were acting for the Manufacturing Company, and not while acting
for the bank. An interval elapsed before an application was made to
the bank for a discount by the Manufacturing Company. If A, while
agent for X, learns a fact, and he later, as agent for Y, acts with reference to a matter as to which the fact is important, this prior knowledge will not be imputed to Y. Although the directors of the Manufacturing Company were at the same time, directors of the bank, they did
not act simultaneously in their two capacities. As directors of the bank,
they acted after they had ceased to act with respect to the acceptance of
the note, as directors of the Crystal Company. Cf. Martin v. Jackson,
27 Pa. 504; Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 102; Barbour v. Wiehle, 116 Pa.
308; Hood v. Fahnestock, 8 W. 489.
When the interest of the agent, in regard to a particular matter, is
adverse to that of his principal, there is no presumption that he will reveal the facts to his principal. "It can never be reasonably inferred that
an agent will communicate his knowledge to his principal where it is
clearly against his own interest to do so" Huffcut, Agency; 153. The
Manufacturing Company desired to obtain the discount of the note. Its
interest was, to refrain from telling the bank what it knew, that would
dissuade it from complying with its desire. We must as much presume
loyalty to the Company, on the part of its directors, as loyalty to the
bank. Inasmuch as the bank would get a good title to the note, if it remained in ignorance of the fact, the silence of the -directors would not
be a breach of their duty to the bank. There is no reason then for imputing their knowledge to the bank.
With principles heretofore expressed, it is impossible to reconcile
Millward-Cliff Cracker Company's Estate, 161 Pa. 157, in which, without
discussion, it was held that when the President of a bank caused the officers of the Cracker Company to make notes in order to have them discounted, not for the company's benefit, but their own, and the president

THE FORUM
of the bank procured their discounting by it, his knowledge of their
character must be attributed to the bank. In Columbian Bank's Estate,
147 Pa. 422, a stockholder of a bank desiring to sell his stock, was persuaded by its president to let him manage the sale, so as to save the
reputation of the bank for solvency and sound management. The stockholder was held apparently to know the insolvency, because the president, his agent, knew it, although his knowledge had not been acquired
in the course of the agency. It is impossible, in deference to these decisions, to hold that the plaintiff bank could be affected with the knowledge
of the three directors.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN SCAPEL v. HORACE TRIL1BEL.
Arbitration.

Conclusiveness of Award.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Trimble employes Scapel to do certain work at so much per day.
Scapel worked twenty-seven full days and on other days, lengths of
time varying from one-half hour to two hours. The contract stipulated
that any disagreement between the parties, as to the number of day's
work, should be referred to a friend, William Small, and his decision
should be final. Small decided that under the contract there would be
compensation only for full day's work, thus depriving Scapel of compensation for twenty days' work to which he claimed to be entited. Paid
for twenty-seven days' work, this suit by Scapel is for twenty additional
days' work, at $4.00 per day. Trimbel's point affirmed by the court was,
that even though the contract plainly meant that Scapel should be paid
for the work done in parts of days as well as in whole days, nevertheless
Judgment for Defendant.
the decision of Small was conclusive.
Appeal.
Easter for the Plaintiff.
When the right of action has accrued, the agreement between the
parties is ineffectual to oust the jurisdiction of the court. Gray v. Wilson 4 Watts 39. Darlington on Personal Property p: 173.
Jenkins for the Defendant.
If the parties by the contract appointed an arbitrator to settle their
differences, they are bound by his award. Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. Fenlon, 4 Watts & Layent, 205. Snodgrass v. Gavit, 28 Pa. 226.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MORAN, J. :-The question presented by this record is, whether an
arbitrator can disregard the terms of the contract in rendering an award.
We think he cannot. "The terms of a contract," said Gibson, C. J"in
Harris v. Liggett, 1 W. & S. 301, "are private laws which the parties
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prescribe for themselves, to fix the measure of their responsibilities; and
they agree to be bound by these and no others. But a judge would bind
them differently, did he enforce between them duties of imperfect obligation, and support an implication of terms to which they did not
accede."
Small's estimate is an adjudication, which is conclusive only upon
the condition that it is made according to the terms of submission; it was
not in his power to change the contract so as to allow either a greater
or a less rate of compensation than was plainly agreed upon.
In order to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, it must clearly appear
that the subject matter of the controversy was within the prospective
submission; the right of trial by jury cannot be taken away by implication: Lauman v. Young, 31 Pa. 306, Dehew v. Altoona, 121 Pa. 401.
We therefore think the affirming of the defendant's point was
erroneous, because it was not within the prospective submission whether
or not Scapel should be paid for work done on fractions of a day. That
was agreed on in the contract. Small was to be the umpire in settling
disputes arising out of the kind, manner and time of performance.
The principle involved in Fenlon v. Monongahela Nav. Co., and
relied on so strongly by the learned counsel for defendant has no application to the case in hand. It was there decided that any dispute between
the eontractor and the company should be settled by the engineer and his
decision would.be conclusive, but it does not decide that an arbiter has the
right to disregard the plain terms of a contract. The defendant's point
should have been refused, and the case submitted to the jury.
Judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
We are unable to concur with the learned superior court in the
opinion that the matter in dispute between the plaintiff and defendant,
is not embraced within the terms of the agreement to refer. Scapel was
to be paid at the rate of $4 per day. In deciding what his earnings
would be, it would be necessary to ascertain how many days or parts of
days he had worked. It would likewise be necessary to determine
whether the contract meant that compensation should be given for
work in fractions of days. The parties have agreed that any disagreement between them "as to the number of day's work," should be referred to Small. This question involves that of the number of days on
which any work was done and also that of the meaning of the parties as
to compensation for work in fractions of days.
The interpretation of the contract is necessary, to the decision of
the controversy, and the arbiter must make it; 23 Super. 51. The application of the law to the case, is often necessary to the solution of a
difference. The arbiter must exercise a judgment upon the law, and
his judgment thereupon, has as much force as his judgment upon the
facts. Connor v. Simpson, 104 Pa. 440; Cf. 3 Cyc. 626; Dixson v. Moorehead, Add. 216; Wentz v. Bealor, 14 C. C. 337; McNally v. Montour
R. R. Co. 23 Super. 51.
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The award does not lose its validity when the court differs from the
arbiter in its interpretation or its construction of the law or when a jury
would come to a different decision upon the facts. If such tests as these
were applied to awards, they would be of no value, and agreements to
submit would be fruitless.
The point of whose affirmance complaint is made, was that the
award would bind although the contract "plainly meant" something
other than what the arbiter assumed it to mean. But, so far as appears,
its "plainly" meaning what it was thus said to mean, is gratuitously assumed. Its meaning is fairly disputable. The court, or, if the interpretation if the contract were for the jury, the jury, might not unreasonably
have put the same interpretation upon it.
But, even if the court should think that the view of the arbiter was
clearly mistaken, this opinion would not warrant its refusing to enforce
the award. The parties having chosen to confide the decision to him,
have agreed to take the risk of error by him. Were the cause litigated
in court, there would be the risk that the court would commit a blunder,
and the parties may have preferred the judgment of their arbiter, to
that of the judge, a preference which it is not treason nor other high
crime to indulge.
Judgment reversed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Federal Usurpation, By FRANxIiN PIERCE, 1908; D. Appleton & Co. New York.
It is not necessary to agree with all the positions taken by the
learned versatile and patriotic writer of this essay, to discover that it is
a work of great significance. There is a freshness and originality in it,
quite uncommon in American books on political institutions. The importance of the topics discussed in it, appears from the themes of several of
its chapters. The Birth of the Constitution, Uurpation in the Civil War
and Reconstruction Period, Executive Usurpation, Congressional Usurpation, The United States Supreme Court and the Absolute Power. Mr.
Pierce does not distinctly oppose the assumption by the courts of the
power to nullify legislation.
He quotes however without dissent the
opinions of Boutmy, Dicey and others, as to the extraordinariness of
such power. Boutmy remarks that the power to control without being
controlled, and whose decisions are supreme, "is represented in the
United States by a small oligarchy of nine irremovable judges. I do not
know of any more striking political paradox than this supremacy of a
non-elected power in the democracy reputed to be of the extreme type."
Opposed as Mr. Pierce is to arrogations of power which has not
been conferred, he exhibits his independence and justness of view, in
defending the right of the United States by its treaties to bind the states.
It is indeed refreshing, in a country whose literature is so generally
Chauvinistic and contemptuous of other peoples, especially of those of
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the so-called inferior races, to read Mr. Pierce's defence of the duty and
right of the Nation to enforce against the states the treaty rights of the
Japanese. Striking is the thought he lifts into clear view, that the
limits to congressional power are not limits to the treaty power, and
therefore, that by treaty the United States can trench on the activities
of the states, when it could not do so by ordinary legislation. Indeed
the chapter on the Treaty Power and State Rights is in all ways admirable.
Such a book is valuable as pointing out the route over which the
governmental developement has travelled; as calling attention to present
tendencies; and as indicating changes and shiftings of power which
may prove, in the future to have been disastrous. Every student of
politics, and political institutions, may read this book with distinct advantage. Whether the tendencies deprecated in it can be seriously
arrested or their directions changed, remains to be seen. In any case,
such a book cannot appear in vain.

FrT.

The Law of Crimes in Pennsylvania, By WILLIAM TRICKThe T. & J. W. Johnson Company, Philadelphia.

The author has, in this work, made a valuable contribution to the
legal literature of Pennsylvania. It will serve a two-fold purpose. The
lawyer will find it an invaluable aid in the determination of the question:
"What have the courts decided?" The courts will find that it will aid
them in the determination of the question: "What shall be decided?"
The author realizes that the decisions upon many points of the law
of crimes are hopelessly in conflict. He does not attempt to reconcile
them. He states the various views upon the unsettled questions, distinguishes them, makes his choice, and gives his reasons for making it.
This absence of "straddle" is refreshing.
The work is based upon a thorough and painstaking examination of
the Pennsylvania decisions and is undoubtedly the most complete and
exhaustive compilations of the decisions in existence. But it is not
merely a digest of the decisions. The reasons upon which the decisions
were based are clearly stated, and when the author disagrees with the
reasoning of the court he does not hesitate to say so. Perhaps the most
noteworthy chapters are those upon the subjects murder and insanity.
Lawyers who have been accustomed to consider Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9,
and Com. v. Mosler 4 Pa. 264, as the alpha and omega of the law upon
these subjects will be surprised to learn how much the decisions of the
court in these cases left unsaid and how much of that which they did say
is illogical and confusing. The crime of murder in the first degree exists
in many jurisdictions, and, in a great majority, the statute defining the
crime is copied verbatim from the Pennsylvania statute. As a consequence there have been many decisions construing this statute, and, as a
general rule, the Pennsylvania statute furnishes the basis of the discussion of the crime of murder in the first degree in text books and encyclo-
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pedias. Many learned articles have been written construing this and
similar statutes. Authors, famous the country over for their knowledge
of the new crimes, have devoted their energies to the task.
After an examination of all the literature upon the crime of murder
in the first degree, the reviewer does not hesitate to say that the chapters in Trickett's Criminal Law are the most luminous exposition of the
subject that has ever been written.
Among the other chapters which are especially noteworthy, are those
upon character evidence, the alibi, conspiracy and intoxication. The
criticisms of the doctrines of Com. v. Gibbons, 3 Super. 408; and Fife v.
Com. 29 Pa. 429, convince one of the absurdity of these decisions.
The arrangement of the book is well suited to the needs of the practicing lawyer. The code of 1860 is the basis of the criminal law of
Pennsylvania and is properly selected as the basis of the discussion of
the various crimes.
The typographical work reflects great credit upon the publishers.
The opportunity has been taken to aid the reader in every possible manner and the black catch lines have the merit of really indicating what
the paragraphs are about.

